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I. INTRODUCTION
When you review the modern employment relationship and the role
of contract, you have to start with the default position of employment-
at-will, which allows an employer, in general, to terminate an em-
ployee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.' A number of
1 Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; B.S.
University of Southern California; M.B.A., California Lutheran; J.D., cum laude, &
M.S.I.R., Loyola University of Chicago; LL.M., University of Wisconsin. This Article
resulted from my presentation at a symposium on "The Role of Contract in the Mod-
ern Employment Relationship," held on March 7, 2003, at Texas Wesleyan University
School of Law, in Fort Worth, Texas. I would like to thank Professor Rachel Arnow-
Richman for inviting me to speak at the symposium. At the time of the symposium, I
was a member of the faculty at Florida Coastal School of Law. So I would like to
thank the Florida Coastal Research Assistant program for its financial support, and
the research efforts of Jessica Dungan, a Fall 2003 graduate of Florida Coastal School
of Law. Special thanks go out to Earl Martin and Cynthia Fountaine for commenting
on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. This at-will employment rule has a long and unusual history as it is a rule
peculiar to the United States. It now has numerous exceptions believed to be neces-
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exceptions to the employment-at-will rule exist, including tort and
statutory employment discrimination claims that allow employees to
seek legal remedies and punitive damage awards from juries. As
these exceptions have developed outside of contract law, employers
have responded by a major contractual effort to shift these disputes
away from the courts and into arbitration. The primary employer
methodology for accomplishing this shift has been to require that em-
ployees agree, at the time of being hired, to arbitrate any disputes
arising out of the employment relationship.
In 1991, the Supreme Court held that an employer could compel
arbitration of a statutory employment discrimination claim based
upon an agreement to arbitrate that occurred as a condition of em-
ployment.2 These one-sided, adhesion3 agreements to arbitrate future
disputes, sometimes referred to as agreements for mandatory arbitra-
tion,4 represent a private contractual response by employers to limit
sary to balance the harsh effects of literal application of the rule. See Mayer G. Freed
& Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 551, 551 (1990); Stephen L. Hayford & Michael J. Evers, The Interaction Be-
tween the Employment-At-Will Doctrine and Employer-Employee Agreements to Arbi-
trate Statutory Fair Employment Practices Claims: Difficult Choices for At-Will
Employers, 73 N.C. L. REV. 443, 445 & n.1, 457-80 (1995); see also Michael Z. Green,
A 2001 Employment Law Odyssey: The Invasion of Privacy Tort Takes Flight in the
Florida Workplace, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 1, 7-11 (2001). But see Deborah A. Ballam,
Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 687
(2000) (asserting that the at-will rule has so many exceptions to it that its continued
existence as a rule is approaching its end); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 947, 951-69 (1984) (describing the at-will
rule as a reasonable economic development with a positive asymmetric result and not
a harsh consequence as employees are just as free to leave employment with any
employer at their will without having to pay the employer).
2. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). This case
involved an age discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). Another primary statutory
prohibition against workplace discrimination is found in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, which covers race, color, sex, religion, and na-
tional origin discrimination. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2003). In the Gilmer decision, the authority for enforcing the
agreement to arbitrate the statutory employment discrimination claim was the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000).
3. Herein I assume the generally understood meaning of an adhesion agreement
in that one side drafts the terms of the agreement into a standard form and then tells
those with whom it intends to transact that they must adhere to these terms or go
elsewhere because the terms are not negotiable. See J.W. Looney & Anita K. Poole,
Adhesion Contracts, Bad Faith, and Economically Faulty Contracts, 4 DRAKE J.
AGRiC. L. 177, 179-82 (1999) (describing the development and history of adhesion
contracts); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Article in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1177 (1983) (describing the "take it or leave it" aspect of adhe-
sion agreements).
4. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Ap-
proach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the
World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 831 n.1 (2002) [hereinafter Sternlight, Out on a
Limb] (commenting about whether these agreements should be called mandatory by
stating as follows: "I put the term 'mandatory' in quotes as a nod to those who insist
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an individual employee's publicly-developed rights and remedies.5
Sadly, the average individual who recoils at the proposal of such an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes with an employer has little bar-
gaining power to actually refuse when the arbitration agreement is
offered as a condition of employment.6 As a result, this individual will
not likely have a chance to pursue any publicly-developed rights pro-
vided by a statute.
In this Article, I focus on how employees can respond and address
excessive bargaining power issues when employers require individual
employees to agree to arbitrate employment disputes as a condition of
employment. My thesis is that individual employees can and should
seek self-help through collective action to level the playing field for
bargaining about arbitration. Furthermore, I contend that the best
collective action would be for unions to play a major role in how indi-
vidual employee disputes, including the various statutory and tort-
based exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, are negotiated
and resolved in arbitration.
Section II of this Article reviews the Supreme Court's analysis of
mandatory arbitration agreements involving statutory employment
discrimination claims and its lack of concern for bargaining power in
enforcing these agreements. Section III addresses the underlying con-
cerns that led employers to excess when seeking mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements, and why that response now appears so insidious to
many employee advocates. Section IV offers a solution to the di-
lemma of bargaining power excess engaged in by employers through
mandatory arbitration-the use of collective employee activity with
the assistance of unions. Finally, this Article concludes that creative
uses of unions as assistants to groups of employees can chill employer
excess and ultimately level the bargaining playing field with respect to
decisions to arbitrate employment disputes.
that arbitration imposed through contracts of adhesion should be categorized as vol-
untary. Personally, however, I cannot understand how a person can be said to have
'voluntarily' accepted arbitration when it is part of a small print contract of adhe-
sion."); see also Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from
Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 400 n.1
(2000) [hereinafter Green, Debunking].
5. See Joseph R. Grodin, On the Interface Between Labor and Employment Law,
19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 310-11 (1998) (noting that it is unusual that the
parties regulated by employment discrimination law, employers, may opt out of that
regime by requiring their employees go to arbitration as a condition of employment);
see also Green, Debunking, supra note 4, at 409 (arguing same); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 395, 397 (1999) (asserting that mandatory arbitration agreements should
not be enforced because a strong public policy in eradicating workplace discrimina-
tion requires a public forum to handle these disputes).
6. Even if an employee does try to refuse to sign such an agreement, he will have
no legal recourse. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d
742, 753-54 (9th Cir. 2003).
20031
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II. AN UNFETTERED POLICY PREFERENCE FOR ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS DESPITE THE LACK OF BARGAINING
POWER FOR INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES
During the last decade, agreements to arbitrate have expanded to
virtually every possible contractual setting, including the employment
relationship.7 In response to that expansion, a multitude of criticism'
7. See Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Em-
ployment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 873-74 & n.4 (2002) (noting that
"employers, sellers of consumer goods, banks, HMOs, and other institutional players
in the economy are using adhesive arbitration clauses, and courts are enforcing them,
despite the criticisms of many commentators."); Murray S. Levin, The Role of Sub-
stantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. Bus. L.J.
105, 105 & n.2, 162 (1997) (noting that the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
"has reported rapid growth in the areas of securities, real estate, franchising, com-
puters, employment, banking, patent, trademark, and copyright disputes"); Sternlight,
Out on a Limb, supra note 4, at 834 (noting that "many credit card providers, banks,
insurers, health care providers, service providers, product sellers, and employers are
using small print clauses to require individuals to trade their right to a day in court for
a right to arbitrate future claims"); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 696 n.9 [hereinafter Drahozal, Unfair]; see also
Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A
Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1239 n.7 (2001) (focusing on consumer con-
tracts but noting the development of mandatory arbitration in the employment area
while also recognizing that employment issues may involve different analyses than
consumer issues). In a recent survey of 627 litigators conducted by the American Bar
Association's Litigation Section about attorneys' use of arbitration, 41.8% of those
who responded were most often involved in Commercial law arbitration. See ABA
Section of Litigation Task Force on ADR Effectiveness, Survey on Arbitration at 10
(Aug. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/adr/surveyreport.
pdf (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review). The remaining percentages were
as follows: 23.0% Construction; 13.2% Labor and Employment Law; 9.6% Personal
injury/tort law; 7.7% securities law; 2.2% Intellectual property law; 2.1% insurance
law and 0.5% International law. Id.
8. There are probably hundreds of articles that critique the issue of mandatory
arbitration. I have found the following articles to be particularly valuable in under-
standing the parameters of mandatory arbitration: Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Dis-
crimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA
LAB L.J. 381 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. POL. J. 189 (1997); Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable
Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361 (2002); Sara Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbi-
tration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between
Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Christine Godsil Cooper,
Where are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrim-
ination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1992); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitra-
tion of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of
Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration:
Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996); Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment
Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77 (1996); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims
in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea
or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitra-
tion, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea]; Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow
Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996) [hereinafter Stone, Yel-
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has arisen, including my own more than ten years ago.9 A number of
critics have focused on the coercive aspects and lack of employee bar-
gaining power when being forced to agree to arbitrate statutory em-
ployment discrimination disputes before a dispute arises." Many of
those critics have primarily sought public and legal resolution (either
by the judiciary or Congress) to prevent employers from forcing these
agreements on employees.11
After more than a decade of cases, much rhetoric about amend-
ments in Congress, 12 years of looking at the criticisms, and even seeing
low Dog] Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims with Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptabil-
ity, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231 (1996).
9. See Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Fu-
ture Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 Loy.
CONSUMER. L. REV. 112 (1993) [hereinafter Green, Preempting Justice].
10. See, e.g., Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with
Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 866-67 (noting the need for
protection from the stronger drafting party in arbitration when that drafter has used
the arbitration clause as an abuse of bargaining power); Sternlight, Panacea, supra
note 8, at 641 (arguing that the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate was only in-
tended for parties with equal bargaining power); Stone, Yellow Dog, supra note 8, at
1036-38 (arguing that individual employees have little chance of negotiating with an
employer about an arbitration clause).
11. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 8, at 149-55; Sternlight, Out on a Limb, supra
note 4, at 832-33. Unfortunately, states cannot directly address the issue of enforce-
ment of these agreements without being preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,490-91 (1987). I argued a little more than 10 years
ago that Congress should step in by amending the FAA to make mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements unenforceable or that the courts could interpret the agreements as
unenforceable. Green, Preempting Justice, supra note 9, at 117-19. Because of bar-
gaining power concerns in mandatory arbitration agreements, I have previously ar-
gued that the analysis applied in some court decisions rejecting waivers of future
claims by older employees should also be applied to employees being asked to waive
court action for future claims in a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 117.
Also, I previously argued that the same requirements in the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA), Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630 (2000)), which requires knowing and vol-
untary consent to enforce a waiver of an age discrimination claim and prohibits pro-
spective waivers by requiring enforcement for only those disputes that have arisen at
the time of the agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2000), should apply to agree-
ments to arbitrate prospective employment disputes. Green, Preempting Justice,
supra note 9, at 118. Apparently, many other commentators have made similar pro-
posals about adapting principles employed under the OWBPA either as a form of
judicial analysis or statutory amendment in deciding about the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses. See Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving Know-
ing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the
Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1206-07, 1207 n.11, 1238
(2002) (stating that "[m]any scholars have argued that a knowing and voluntary stan-
dard of consent should be applied" and "scholars have widely supported applying the
OWBPA's consent standard" to mandatory arbitration agreements).
12. Senator Russell Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, obviously believes that
Congress should take action to stop mandatory arbitration, but he has not been suc-
cessful in mounting any major effort at passing legislation. See Russell D. Feingold,
Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 284, 298
(2002); see also R. Larson Frisby, Congress Considers Curbs on Mandatory Arbitra-
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some persuasive commentaries about why mandatory arbitration
might still benefit employees regardless of the coercion involved, 3 I
have concluded that the issue of contractual bargaining power rests at
the center of this controversy. 14 Accordingly, if bargaining power can
reach at least a happy medium between employees and employers to
form a high level of knowing, voluntary, and informed consent,15 the
tion of Consumer and Employment Disputes, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 31
(describing Senate consideration of legislation introduced by Senator Feingold to pre-
vent enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements).
13. See Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 763-64 (2003); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the
Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
73, 76 (1999); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective Bargaining Context, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 491 (2001) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Gilmer]; Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmiti-
gated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 1 (1998) [hereinafter St.
Antoine, Mandatory]. Without asserting any support for or criticism of mandatory
arbitration in the employment setting, I have even argued previously that there are
clear benefits for employees who can take their statutory discrimination claims to
arbitration rather than face the dismal prospects of succeeding in court. See Green,
Debunking, supra note 4, at 453-54.
14. This is not the first time that I have noted the problem with bargaining power
in enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements. See Green, Debunking, supra note 4,
at 418. Nor am I the first to reach the conclusion that bargaining power is an issue of
concern in these agreements. See Cole, supra note 8, at 459; Leona Green, Mandatory
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy Issue in Need of a
Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 173, 200-01 (1998);
Harding, supra note 10, at 862-63; Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The
Law of the Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
479, 512-24 (2001); Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 8, at 711; see also Robert Rabin,
The Role of Government in Regulating the Workplace, 13 LAB. LAW. 1, 17-19 (1997).
But see Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L.
537, 537-41 (2002) [hereinafter Drahozal, Nonmutual] (arguing that agreements to
arbitrate do not require that one party has to assent at the same level as the other
party and that to force it will make the agreements unfair for consumers or
employees).
15. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbi-
tral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1406-07, 1415
(1996) (criticizing the Supreme Court's refusal to consider lack of consent in its rul-
ings preferring arbitration); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996); Reilly, Comment, supra note 11, at 1235-36.
There are some debates about what "actual consent" may mean. See Richard C. Reu-
ben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring
Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 827
n.40 (2003) (noting differences in interpretations of consent versus "actual consent");
see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 270
(1986) (claiming "consent" in contracts is "the moral component that distinguishes
valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights"); Blake E. Morant, The Quest for Bar-
gains in an Age of Contractual Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 233, 252 (2003) (explaining the parameters of consent
as follows: "The authenticity of consent confirms a contract's legitimacy. Considera-
tion notwithstanding, consent ultimately becomes the primary determinant of con-
tract enforcement. Consent, synonymous with intent, has been historically regarded
as a 'meeting of the minds' of the parties.").
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incessant number of articles and critiques about mandatory arbitra-
tion and its highlight as a major issue of the past decade can come to
an end. Critics can then focus on the broader aspects of whether arbi-
tration of statutory employment disputes warrants the attention it has
received the last ten years.
16
In the 1991 case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,7 the
Supreme Court opened the door to enforcement of mandatory arbi-
tration of statutory employment discrimination claims.18 As a condi-
tion of his employment as a financial manager for Interstate/Johnson
Lane, Gilmer had to sign a registration application with the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) requiring that he go to arbitration over any
controversy with his employer. 19 The application, executed at the
time of hire, became the source of the employer's motion to compel
arbitration several years later when Gilmer filed a statutory age dis-
crimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).2 ° Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the
Court compelled the arbitration of the ADEA claim.21 Because the
agreement was not literally between the employer and the employee,
but between the NYSE and the employee, the Supreme Court saved
for "another day" the question of whether section 1 of the FAA22 ex-
cludes individual employment agreements from FAA coverage.23 Al-
16. Quite possibly, the aura of using arbitration has worn off as mediation of em-
ployment disputes appears to be the real growth area for employment discrimination
dispute resolution. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitra-
tion: The Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation, and What it Means for the ADR
Field, 3 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 111, 111 (2002); Theodore 0. Rogers, The Procedural
Differences Between Litigation in Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIo ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 633, 640 (2001); see also Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist,
Mediation in Employment Cases is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational Conflict
Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1998);
Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years:
Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305,
334-38 (2001); Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of
Mediation in Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135
(1999); Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L.
REV. 431 (1996); Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583.
17. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
18. Before the Gilmer decision, "most parties believed that courts would not en-
force agreements requiring mandatory arbitration of statutory employment discrimi-
nation claims." Green, Debunking, supra note 4, at 408 & n.26; see also Robert N.
Covington, Employment Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the
United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 346 (1998) (noting that before the
1990s many thought an employer could not insist upon arbitration).
19. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
20. Id. at 23-24. The ADEA can be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
21. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
22. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("[N]othing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.").
23. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
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though there was still some question as to whether a direct agreement
between an employer and an employee would be enforceable under
the FAA after Gilmer, most lower courts ran with the decision and
started a pattern of broad enforcement of mandatory arbitration
agreements involving statutory employment discrimination claims.24
After a decade of uncertainty, "another day" finally arrived in 2001
when the Supreme Court, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,2 5 an-
swered the question left open in Gilmer and made it very clear that
agreements to arbitrate future employment disputes can be enforcea-
ble when entered into directly between an employer and an em-
ployee.26 In Circuit City, the employee, Saint Clair Adams, made
allegations of discrimination and unfair treatment under the Califor-
nia Fair Employment and Housing Act and under state tort law.
2 7
The Court held that the language in Section 1 of the FAA excluding
"contracts of employment" only applied to contracts of employees
who are transportation workers.28
The Circuit City decision clearly left the field for mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory employment disputes wide open. Since the Gilmer
decision in 1991, the Supreme Court has generally supported and en-
dorsed the arbitration of all forms of agreements. After reviewing the
majority of decisions regarding arbitration by the Supreme Court
since 1991,29 and specifically mandatory arbitration of statutory em-
ployment disputes,3" I have noticed an interesting thread. In the only
two cases where the employer argued that arbitration should be com-
pelled and the employer did not prevail, collective employee interests
were also at issue.31
In the first case, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,32 the
Court addressed the issue of whether an agreement for mandatory
arbitration would be enforceable in a union setting involving a collec-
24. See Green, Debunking, supra note 4, at 411 & n.39, 412 & n.42 (citing cases).
25. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
26. See id. at 119.
27. Id. at 110.
28. Id. at 119.
29. See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003); Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala-
bama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of America, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866
(1998); Wright v. Universal Marine Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
30. See supra notes 17-28 and infra notes 32-51.
31. See infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
32. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
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tive bargaining agreement.33 The Court decided that in order for a
union to waive an individual employee's right to pursue a discrimina-
tion claim in a judicial forum, a clear and unmistakable relinquish-
ment of the right to pursue the statutory claim in question must
exist.34 It is unlikely that a union would agree to provide a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of any individual employee's right to take his or
her employment discrimination dispute into court.35
Accordingly, a bargaining power anomaly has developed from
Wright and Gilmer. When a union with bargaining power represents
an individual employee with no bargaining power, as in Wright, the
clear and unmistakable waiver requirement limits an employer from
seeking mandatory arbitration. In contrast, when an individual em-
ployee with no bargaining power and no collective interests at issue,
as in Gilmer, is forced to arbitrate as a condition of employment, there
is no clear and unmistakable waiver requirement.
There is some debate about how to apply Wright in line with a 1974
Court decision. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,3 6 the Court
found that an employee could pursue any individual claim he had
under Title VII in court even if he had already used the grievance and
arbitration process provided by the employer and his union pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement.37 According to the Court, by
processing the employee's grievance through arbitration, the union
had not waived the statutory rights of the employee to file a Title VII
claim.38 The Court also found that a union cannot agree to waive an
individual employee's future pursuit of statutory rights in court.3 9
Although it is by no means settled, at least one decision issued since
Wright has raised concerns about Gardner-Denver's requirement that
a union cannot waive an individual employee's right to go to trial. In
Air Line Pilots Ass'n International v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,n° the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals applied Gardner-Den-
33. Id. at 72.
34. Id. at 79-80.
35. St. Antoine, Gilmer, supra note 13, at 502; see also Marion Crain & Ken Ma-
theny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1842 (2001) [hereinafter Crain &
Matheny, Identity] (asserting that "unions will have a powerful disincentive to negoti-
ate for antidiscrimination provisions in labor contracts because they risk waiving unit
members' rights to proceed in court with statutory antidiscrimination claims").
36. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
37. Id. at 50 (finding that "[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual and
statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the
same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both
rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.").
38. See id. at 51-52.
39. Id. at 51. The Court subsequently banned prospective waivers by a union of
an individual employee's rights under other statutes in McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (banning waivers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)) and
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (banning waivers
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000)).
40. 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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ver and ruled that, if a union cannot waive an employee's right to trial,
an employer can negotiate directly with individual employees about
mandatory arbitration agreements without having to deal with the
union.41 This decision seems to circumvent the union's role and would
normally raise concerns under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),42 which prohibits an employer from dealing directly with
employees who are represented by a union.43 It also seems to be con-
trary to the purpose of the NLRA, which recognized that problems of
bargaining power between individual employees and employers, and
the consequences from that imbalance, required that employees have
the legal authorization to use unions as their representative to bridge
that bargaining power gap.4 4 Hopefully, the Supreme Court will clar-
ify the boundaries of Gardner-Denver, Gilmer, and Wright as high-
lighted by the difficulties from the Air Line Pilots decision, or perhaps
the Air Line Pilots decision represents an anomaly.45
In the second case rejecting an employer's attempt to enforce a
mandatory arbitration agreement, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,46 the
Court found that the EEOC could bring an enforcement action for all
equitable and legal remedies available under law, including back-pay,
reinstatement, and compensatory and punitive damages, even though
the individual employee who filed the charge had agreed with the em-
41. See id. at 484-86.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
43. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 52 (1975).
44. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); see also Richard
A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment
Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 687, 688 (1997)
(stating that "[t]he NLRA was premised on the assumption that the best way to pro-
tect American employees was to give sufficient bargaining power to permit meaning-
ful negotiation over the terms and conditions of employment"). Cf. Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509,
1511 (1981) (asserting that the NLRA was "based on a false assumption: the assump-
tion that management and labor have equal power in the workplace").
45. See Ann C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized Work-
place: Is Bargaining with the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 513,
516-20 (2001); Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy, 24
HARV. J. L. Pun. POL'Y 489, 498 (2000); see also Crain & Matheny, Identity, supra
note 35, at 1841-45. Compare Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment
Grievances: A Representation Dilemma for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 9
(1999) (identifying conflicts for unions in pursuing the collective interests of the mem-
bership versus individual claims of employees alleging discrimination claims), and
Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and
the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial
Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135, 201-03 (asserting that unions should not be allowed to
waive individual employee rights to statutory discrimination claims because of the
conflicts posed), with Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Re-
form: Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 827,
845-47 (1996) (asserting that unions should be able to waive individual employees'
Title VII claims in an agreement with an employer because, without that waiver, the
prospect of allowing employees essentially another chance to adjudicate their claim
discourages employers from entering into agreements to arbitrate).
46. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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ployer to arbitrate any employment disputes.47 This decision high-
lighted the concern about the collective public rights that the EEOC
must vindicate through its enforcement policies.48 Because the EEOC
is not a party to the arbitration agreement, it is still able to seek all the
same relief in court that the individual employee may not seek be-
cause of the arbitration agreement.49
Under Waffle House, the employer may still end up in court defend-
ing itself and trying to prevent a large jury verdict based upon claims
of an employee who agreed to arbitrate pursuant to mandatory arbi-
tration. Because the EEOC only takes a small percentage of cases,5 °
an employer may be willing to gamble that its arbitration agreement
may survive through a sheer numbers test. However, if an individual
employee files a charge raising a systemic, class-based issue for a large
collective of employees, the EEOC may be more likely to take the
case.
51
A mere individual employee operating with no bargaining power
and no collective interests at issue will likely succumb to the harsh
rule of Gilmer and the generally unfettered preference for arbitration
by the Court. However, when the broader, collective interests of em-
ployees as a whole are involved, as in Waffle House, the policy of
favoring arbitration finally gives way to something else: the policy of
47. Id. at 297-98.
48. See id. at 290.
49. Id. at 292. If the employee has already recovered remedies in arbitration, any
amount received by the employee may limit the final award issued to the EEOC. Id.
at 296. In Gilmer, the Court made it clear that an individual subject to an arbitration
agreement is still free to file an EEOC charge, and that arbitration agreements "will
not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable re-
lief." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
50. See Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration be Reconciled with Section 7
Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 175 n.5 (2003) [hereinafter Hodges, Section 7
Rights]. But see Michael W. Hawkins, Current Trends in Class Action Employment
Litigation, 19 LAB. LAW. 33, 35 (2003) (describing an increase in class action filings by
the EEOC from 1997 to 2001 up to an overall increase by 2001 to "210 class cases,"
which represented "40 percent of the total docket" and asserting that the increase in
filings was due to an increase in the staffing of attorneys at the EEOC during this
time period). Professor Ann C. Hodges has also asserted that a problem with relying
on the EEOC to right the wrongs that may occur through mandatory arbitration is
that the EEOC normally starts its enforcement efforts based upon an employee-filed
charge and if employees have entered into agreements to arbitrate, they may not real-
ize they can file EEOC charges. Hodges, Section 7 Rights, supra at 231-32.
51. See Hawkins, supra note 50, at 36 (noting an increase in the filing of class
actions by the EEOC). In the EEOC's 1997 enforcement plan, it noted that it would
focus on systemic and class-based cases. See Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission National Enforcement
Plan, § 11(c), (describing "systemic investigations and litigation" as part of the
EEOC's enforcement focus) at http://www.eeoc.gov/nep.html (last visited Oct. 23,
2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
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having the EEOC independently vindicate statutory rights and en-
force its public mandate for the collective interests of all employees.52
After Wright and Waffle House, employers really have no guarantee
that an arbitration agreement will preclude an employee's claims from
getting into court. When entities with bargaining power like a union
or the EEOC are involved, mandatory arbitration may not be en-
forced. Some have argued that the Supreme Court must have gotten
it backwards and should have offered more protections to the individ-
ual employee with no bargaining power, as in Gilmer, rather than the
individual employee in either Wright or Waffle House, who had the
union and the EEOC, respectively, in a position to bargain for a bet-
ter result.53 Although the Circuit City decision made it clear that
mandatory arbitration agreements for statutory employment discrimi-
nation claims would be enforceable,54 Wright and Waffle House leave
the door open to protect broader collective interests of employees by
those entities that may represent their interests in the judicial system
or in arbitration.
III. EXPLORING THE REASONS FOR EMPLOYER BARGAINING
POWER EXCESS: A BALANCE OF PERCEIVED CORPORATE
GREED VERSUS HEIGHTENED FEARS
OF LARGE JURY VERDICTS
The privatization of employment dispute resolution through arbi-
tration has become a major reality over the last decade. Certain
52. See Crain & Matheny, Identity, supra note 35, at 1815 n.287 (discussing the
implications of Waffle House and asserting that "[t]he underlying tension in Waffle
House is between the federal pro-arbitration policy and the rights of individuals to
contract freely with regard to the terms of their employment on one hand, and the
public interest in eradicating employment discrimination on the other" because "[tihe
EEOC functions as more than just an enforcer for individual employee rights against
discrimination, it is the watchdog for the public's interest" and "the EEOC makes
resource allocation decisions about which claims it will pursue based on its assessment
of the most significant impact for workers as a whole").
53. See, e.g., St. Antoine, Gilmer, supra note 13, at 503-04 (suggesting that the
holdings in Gardner-Denver and Gilmer are "backwards" because of the reversals of
bargaining power with the union having it in Gardner-Denver and the individual em-
ployee not having it in Gilmer); Scalia, supra note 45, at 497-98 (criticizing the results
in Gilmer versus Gardner-Denver by saying, "Thus, we have the circumstance that an
agreement achieved by a labor union-which the NLRA and theories of collective
action presume to be a far more effective negotiating agent than an individual em-
ployee-is not enforceable; but an agreement signed by an individual employee as a
condition of employment-which the employee presumably give[s] little attention [to]
at the time of hiring-is enforceable."); Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of
Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMp. L. 177, 192-93
(2001) (asserting that the decisions in both Gardner-Denver and Gilmer were wrong).
54. But see infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
55. See Covington, supra note 18, at 411; Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson,
Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitra-
tion from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1188 (1993); Sid
L. Moller, Birth of Contract: Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace, 50 S.C. L. Rev.
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norms develop when operating privately to resolve nonunion employ-
ment disputes.56 The development of employment law in the nonun-
ion workplace follows from the employment-at-will principle, which
operates as the default rule.57 Commentators have raised concerns
about consent by individuals when large entities get them to contract
out of the public system of dispute resolution into a private dispute
resolution system.58 Because of this major privatization of employ-
ment disputes, employees should not rely on efforts to have the
courts, or even Congress, correct the imbalance of bargaining power
over mandatory arbitration agreements. Instead, employees should
take matters into their own hands through collective action, 59 espe-
cially through union representation or involvement.
Now, some may question whether it is a good thing to have employ-
ees collectively respond to employers regarding mandatory arbitra-
tion. Employers save money and time by entering into standard form
adhesion agreements, 60 and more costly transactions may eventually
harm employees of the company, if the company can no longer save
those expenses. 6' However, employer expenses related to the lack of
informed consent and bargaining power of employees in mandatory
183, 185-86 (1998); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing
Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 705-09 (1999); see also John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the
Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 967 (1988) (reviewing the applica-
tion of arbitration to resolve shareholder derivative class action suits).
56. See Moller, supra note 55, at 184 & n.1.
57. Moller, supra note 55, at 187; see also Hayford & Evers, supra note 1, at
505-06.
58. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (2002); Michele M. Buse, Comment, Con-
tracting Employment Disputes Out of the Jury System: An Analysis of the Implementa-
tion of Binding Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace and Proposals to Reduce the
Harsh Effects of a Non-Appealable Award, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1485, 1523 (1995); see
also Alderman, supra note 7, at 1246-49 (criticizing mandatory arbitration as not in-
volving real consent of the individual because it involves an adhesion agreement and
differences in bargaining power).
59. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2002) (arguing
for the use of more private justice by individuals on the inside of corporations).
60. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (noting how much more costly
it is for the drafter of a standard form adhesion agreement to allow someone to nego-
tiate changes to its standard forms and how it is better for the drafter to just refuse to
allow negotiation and spread the costs over a large number of transactions).
61. Drahozal, Nonmutual, supra note 14, at 555-61; Stephen J. Ware, Paying the
Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J.
Disp. RESOL. 89, 90-93; see Drahozal, Unfair, supra note 7, at 741, 762-64. But see
Sternlight, Out on a Limb, supra note 4, at n.65 (arguing that cost savings resulting
from standard form arbitration clauses do not get passed back to consumers or em-
ployees because "absent perfect competition, companies will be able to keep any
profits they secure by imposing binding arbitration").
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arbitration agreements still continue from all of the ongoing criticism,
backlash, and challenges to these agreements.62
The Supreme Court has said that arbitration agreements may be
challenged on the basis of normal contract challenges "such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability. ' ' 63 Although "fraud and duress have
been difficult to establish, 64 ongoing challenges to mandatory arbitra-
tion include claims that these agreements are: unconscionable by be-
ing too one-sided;65 illusory and lacking in consideration;6 6 unfair in
making the employee pay for all or part of the costs of arbitration;
67
62. Despite the Supreme Court's general endorsement of mandatory arbitration
agreements in 2001 with its decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001), a number of legal challenges still continue. See infra notes 62-68 and accom-
panying text.
63. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1996) (exploring the ramifications of uncon-
scionability claims under the FAA after the Doctor's Associates decision). Professor
Ware has also offered a thorough analysis of the application of unconscionability prin-
ciples in the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate specifically involving employees.
See id. at 1028-34.
64. Hodges, Section 7 Rights, supra note 50, at 180.
65. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir.
2003); Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local
400, 289 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889,
894 (9th Cir. 2002); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 937-39 (4th Cir.
1999); see also Faber v. Menard, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 961, 977-79 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
66. See, e.g., Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); Penn
v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2001); Floss v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 314-16 (6th Cir. 2000); Gibson v.
Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1997); Hull v.
Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985).
67. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., 279 F.3d at 895; Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The underlying issue of what courts
should consider in trying to decide whether being compelled to pay for the costs of
arbitration should invalidate the agreement to arbitrate was not clearly addressed by
the Supreme Court, but the Court did find that the burden is on the person challeng-
ing the agreement to establish that the costs of arbitration being levied are so prohibi-
tive that they prevent the challenger from vindicating a legitimate claim under the
statute at issue. Green Tree Fin. Corp-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000).
The number of court decisions since Green Tree are not clear about whether the costs
of arbitration may prevent enforcement of an arbitration agreement. See Michael H.
Leroy & Peter Feuille, When is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 143, 177 (2002). A debate about the costs of arbitration for individuals began
with a consumer group asserting that arbitration is very costly, and critics have re-
sponded by challenging those findings and asserting that service providers, like the
American Arbitration Association, have made sincere efforts to limit costs for indi-
viduals. See Samuel Estreicher & Matthew Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbi-
tration: A Critique of Public Citizen's Jeremaiad on the Costs of Arbitration, 57 Disp.
RESOL. J. 8, 10-11 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Nov.
2, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at
Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the
American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777, 792, 794-803
(2003).
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inappropriately banning class actions;6" and violating certain public
policies by preventing the recovery of the same remedies that would
be available in the courts.69 Employers continue to face these chal-
lenges because of ongoing concerns about lack of informed consent
and bargaining power when agreeing to arbitrate as a condition of
employment. Other problems with mandatory arbitration are also
starting to occur, including dwindling employee morale7 ° and overall
frustration with the results from and the limits of arbitration. 71 Never-
68. See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 368-69 (3d Cir. 2000);
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995). But see Ting v. AT&T, 319
F.3d 1126, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003) (mem.). Profes-
sor Jean R. Sternlight has offered several reasons for criticism about the effect that
mandatory arbitration agreements can have on class actions. See Jean R. Sternlight,
As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Sur-
vive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 125-26 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight, Should an Arbi-
tration Provision Trump the Class Action? No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class
Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Would Be Dangerous and Unwise, Dis,.
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 13. Several other commentators are starting to raise
issues concerning class actions and mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Hodges, Section 7
Rights, supra note 50, at 204-23; Richard Jeydel, Consolidation, Joinder and Class
Actions: What Arbitrators and Courts May and May Not Do, 57 Disp. REsOL. J. 24
(Jan. 2003); Andrea Lockridge, Note, The Silent Treatment: Removing the Class Ac-
tion from the Plaintiffs Toolbox Without Ever Saying A Word, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL.
255. In Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003), the Supreme Court
sidestepped the issue as to whether mandatory arbitration clauses that are silent as to
class actions effectively prohibit class actions under Section 4 of the FAA. The perti-
nent part of Section 4 of the FAA states: "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure,
neglect or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration
may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4
(2000). The Court in Green Tree decided that the determination of the issue about
whether a silent mandatory arbitration agreement could ban a class action was for the
arbitrator to make in the first instance, not for the courts, and remanded the case. See
Green Tree, 123 S. Ct. at 2408.
69. In Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003), the Court
again refused to decide whether a court must compel arbitration and left it for an
arbitrator to decide the issue as to if the agreement bans punitive damages and
whether it may be enforced if such a ban conflicts with the remedies to be provided by
the statutory scheme at issue. Although the agreement banned punitive damages, it
was not so clear that it prevented the statutory remedy of treble damages and so it
was for the arbitrator to decide this in the first instance. Id. at 1535-36; see also
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 279 F.3d at 894-95; Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc.,
134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11th Cir. 1998); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc, 983 F. Supp.
459, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6
P.3d 669, 683 (Cal. 2000).
70. See Simon J. Nadel, Mandatory Arbitration Not for All Employers; Cost, Fair-
ness Still Subject of Debate, 70 U.S.L.W. 2755, 2756 (June 4, 2002) (noting that
mandatory arbitration agreements can provide a source for low employee morale);
see also Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in
American Labor Law, 30 DuQ. L. REV. 779, 811 (1992) (noting that boosting em-
ployee morale substitutes for union organization).
71. See St. Antoine, Gilmer, supra note 13, at 509 (stating that "[e]mployer enthu-
siasm for mandatory arbitration even for individual employees, is not all that it was in
the past" as management has become aware of employees' greater success rate rather
than in court litigation).
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theless, if arbitration poses such major benefits as advocates of
mandatory arbitration assume, then the mandatory aspects of agree-
ing to it as a condition of employment should not make a difference.
Employer advocates may believe that arbitration and alternatives to
the litigation system provide a welcome respite, if not an outright pan-
acea, when compared to the overworked judicial system. Such views
also rest on paranoid concerns about excessive and unprincipled ver-
dicts from runaway juries.72 One commentator, who obviously sup-
ports this view, has said:
What we have, in effect, is a uniquely American employment law
lottery. Most employees work on an at-will basis and have no viable
legal claim in the event of a job termination. Many of those work-
ers who may have a legitimate claim are unable to pursue it because
of the high entry cost of our justice system. Employers, nonethe-
less, fear employment termination suits and spend considerable
sums in deterring and settling lawsuits. The only real winners in this
system are the handful of plaintiffs who strike it big before a jury.
73
Nevertheless, the result of acting on these unfounded fears of jury
verdicts74 and lack of employer autonomy leaves the evolution of
workplace disputes few options other than just to hope that employers
will do the right thing. This would continue to allow employers to use
their overwhelming bargaining power to contract for whatever proce-
dural and substantive mechanisms they want as long as the courts are
willing to enforce them under the guise of supporting arbitration.
A key example of this flawed system involves statutory employment
discrimination claims. In 1991, Congress granted employees the statu-
tory right to a jury trial and legal damages for employment discrimina-
tion claims.75 On the other hand, the courts, by allowing employers to
72. See Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High
Stakes Employment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 119 (2002); Wei-
ler, supra note 53, at 193-95. But see Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law
at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351,
402 (2002) (stating that "defense costs through trial hover at around $250,000 in a
typical employment termination case" but admitting that "employers prevail in most
employment suits"); Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Media-
tion of Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 22 (1997) (arguing that an employer
can spend "hundreds of thousands of dollars" defending a wrongful discharge suit);
St. Antoine, Gilmer, supra note 13, at 509-10 (noting that an attorney had informed
Professor St. Antoine that "successful defense in a jury trial may cost $100,000 to
$200,000, and a complex discrimination case may run into the millions").
73. Befort, supra note 72, at 402-03.
74. I have previously tried to explain that the reasons for corporate fears about
jury verdicts are unfounded and based upon a certain degree of paranoia due to the
publicity involved in the few disputes that do involve major verdicts. Green, De-
bunking, supra note 4, at 454-59 & n.206 (citing Steven Garber, Product Liability,
Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 Wis. L. REV.
237, 250).
75. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000). This landmark legislation
also created new remedies by allowing victims of intentional employment discrimina-
tion under Title VII to obtain compensatory and punitive damages relief with the only
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use their excessive bargaining power to contract out of the jury trial
system and into arbitration, have placed concerns about employer au-
tonomy and costs of litigation, along with the concern for clearing
their crowded court dockets, above the statutory rights of employees.
Despite the jury trial process for resolving employment discrimination
claims that Congress created, the courts have essentially entrusted the
dispute resolution process to the employers to devise it as they see fit
when resolving these claims through arbitration.76
Public trust of corporations probably rests at a very low premium
right now. Similar to the hyperbole about runaway jury trials,77 there
exists a lot of exaggeration about greedy and unfeeling employers who
are allegedly too willing to exercise Machiavellian tendencies and dra-
conian methods in dealing with employees, especially with the role
that the Enron Corporation debacle and other highly publicized acts
proviso being a limit on actual recovery based upon the number of employees that the
employer has. See id. at § 1981a(b)(3); see also Silverstein, supra note 14, at 499-500
(discussing the importance and significance of obtaining the right to jury trials and
compensatory and punitive damages in employment discrimination suits and why
those rights should not be so easily waived).
76. Arbitration service providers also play a role in how these agreements are
enforced, and they have made attempts to self-regulate by following the Due Process
Protocol, a joint agreement requiring certain fairness in disputes submitted to arbitra-
tion pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause. See American Arbitration Associa-
tion, Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution In Employment, A Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out, of the Em-
ployment Relationship, at http://www.adr.org (May 9, 1995) (on file with the Texas
Wesleyan Law Review). Most recently, concerns about mandatory arbitration, in-
cluding lack of public decisions and a lack of agreement by employees about costs of
arbitration, are being addressed by the American Arbitration Association, one of the
biggest providers of arbitration services. See Press Release, American Arbitration
Association, American Arbitration Association Announces Changes Aimed at Fair-
ness for Employees in Arbitration (Oct. 29, 2002), at http://www.adr.org (last visited
Oct. 20, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
77. See Hawkins, supra note 50, at 54 (describing several recent "high-profile"
discrimination class actions against "Fortune 500 companies, including Coca-Cola Co.,
Microsoft Corp., Boeing Co., Home Depot, Inc., Texaco, Inc., Mitsubishi Cos., Inc.,
Lockheed Martin Corp., and Southern Co." and noting that the "Texaco and Coca-
Cola . . . settlements exceeded $150 million" with the Coca-Cola settlement being
"$192.5 million ... the largest ever in a race bias discrimination case brought in the
United States" (citations omitted)). Nevertheless, there exists little data to "support
the incessant corporate fear of jury verdicts and large punitive damage[s]" as a whole.
Green, Debunking, supra note 4, at 459; see also Marc Galanter, The Day After the
Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 27 (1986) (finding that "[i]n federal, as in
state courts, most cases settle"); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Conten-
tious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27 (1983) (noting that "most civil
cases in American courts are settled" and "terminate in an outcome agreed upon by
the parties"). Most information about employment discrimination disputes in federal
courts indicates that employers are most likely going to win ninety percent of the time
before going to trial. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir.
1997).
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of corporate greed have played in judging corporate responsibility
over the last two years.78
To lift the hyperbolic fog about runaway jury verdicts and the need
to punish greedy employers as a pro and con to mandatory arbitra-
tion, respectively, and to get at the heart of the matter, requires a
focus on bargaining power and its role in the decision to arbitrate. An
analysis must focus on the balance of bargaining power between those
occasionally greedy employers who involve themselves in ethical
breaches of enormous proportions potentially resulting in bankruptcy
with thousands of employees losing jobs and pensions79 versus those
rare number of employees who win excessively huge verdicts and ac-
78. My contention that the focus on corporate greed is a bit of an exaggeration is
mostly an anecdotal assertion from having spent most of my life during the last 15
years focused on workplace issues as a manager for a Fortune 500 corporation super-
vising a large group of employees, an advocate for labor unions, an advocate for em-
ployers, and then as a neutral law professor. From that experience, it is my belief that
most employers want to do a good job and overall they do. See THOMAS J. PETERS &
ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE (1982) (chronicling many
corporate success stories along with their excellent managers who truly value their
employees as the key resource for their companies); see also Steven H. Hobbs, To-
ward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 243 & n.14, 273
(1997) (describing wonderful developments of businesses and companies through in-
novative entrepreneurs and the growth of small businesses in this country); Donald
Hastings, The Role of Incentives, Profit Sharing, and Employee Participation in the
Development of Human Resources in the United States, 22 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 135, 136
(1996) (criticizing companies in a rush to downsize as having poor managers with no
innovation, and for causing disastrous results for those employees instead of valuing
them as key human resources and encouraging their productivity). But see Joseph A.
Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the
Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 876 & n.89 (1993) (describing problems with poor man-
agement, bankruptcy, etc., of many public companies, including subsequently poor
results for a number of the successful companies, but still identifying some very well-
run companies, too). Nevertheless, when managers become obsessed with their great-
ness or sense that they are all-powerful and can do whatever they want without retri-
bution, they do make major ethical breaches or openly discriminate, and when those
events are finally exposed, they are highly publicized. See Patrick Emery Longan,
Lessons From Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance-Foreword, 54 MER-
CER L. REV. 663, 664 (2003) (noting that the name Enron "has become synonymous
with corporate greed"); see also Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor: Experts Say the
Energy Giant's Collapse Could Trigger Changes in the Law that Make it Easier to
Snare Professionals, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 40, 42 (identifying the comments of
Washington University Law School Dean, Joel Seligman, an expert on securities law,
and questioning "to what extent [the] Enron [debacle] is an extraordinary and iso-
lated event" and suggesting that, regardless, there will be legislation passed to address
it); Hawkins, supra note 50, at 54 (describing a number of high-profile and widely
publicized discrimination cases involving many Fortune 500 companies).
79. See Bucy, supra note 59, at 9-10 & nn.18-27; see also Charles B. Craver, The
American Worker. Junior Partner in Success and Senior Partner in Failure, 37 U.S.F. L.
REV. 587, 607-25 (2003) (describing the inequities in how rank and file employees
and managers are treated in comparison to highest level managers in corporations).
See generally Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive
Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861 (2003) (criticizing the growth of a manage-
rial elite and the decline of labor in corporate governance as a check on management
abuse and immorality).
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tually pocket that money while damaging a company's reputation and
its bottom line. If the reality is that a few more jury verdicts may
occur and potentially prevent some large businesses, and maybe even
a middle-sized business, from having to pay its leaders or owners a
golden parachute upon retirement8 ° with major stock options,81 why
not let the balance come a little more to the employees' side for a
while?82
Employers, as a whole, have the balance of bargaining power in
their favor when dealing with employees. When they choose to use it
wisely, it has not caused them problems under the economic underpin-
nings of our capitalist system that values the general freedom to con-
tract. However, the continued massive use of mandatory arbitration
by some employers does constitute an excessive use of bargaining
power, especially given the powerful imbalance of the default rule of
at-will employment. One commentator has recently used empirical
evidence to argue that employers are not likely to agree to arbitrate
after a dispute arises,83 and a few others have raised this point anec-
80. Retirement packages for executives are being heavily scrutinized and criticized
lately. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., Outsider Chosen Interim NYSE Chief, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 22, 2003, § 1, at 10 (describing events that led to the resignation of New
York Stock Exchange head, Richard Grasso); Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Cor-
porate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2003) (chronicling the
gross and excessive retirement perks that General Electric provided to its outgoing
Chairman and CEO Jack Welch).
81. See Weiler, supra note 53, at 184-85 (asserting that some may find that
"CEO's and their top colleagues have clearly earned these spiraling salaries, because
they have been running the companies whose profits and stock prices have been soar-
ing during this era," but exposing that corporate profits over the last quarter century
have risen due to downsizing labor costs by "gradually reducing the coverage of bene-
fits such as health care and pension plans," and identifying the personal incentives for
top managers to act this way, such as larger shares of executive pay, usually in the
form of stock options).
82. I say "for a while" because creative and crafty employers will use whatever
bargaining power they have to find additional ways to benefit themselves in their
relationship with their employees as any for-profit capitalist business would likely do.
See Bucy, supra note 59, at 10 (noting that corporate greed will lead businesses to find
loopholes to counter any attempts to regulate them).
83. David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitra-
tion Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimina-
tion Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 62-65 (2003). In trying to
make the case that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate won't work, Professor David
Sherwyn relied significantly on a study of results from a dispute resolution program in
Chicago, Illinois run by the Center for Employment Dispute Resolution (CEDR)
from 1994-1998 and where parties to employment discrimination disputes before the
Illinois Human Rights Commission were offered an opportunity to arbitrate or medi-
ate their claims. From his assessment, Professor Sherwyn concludes that the selection
rate for these post-dispute offers to arbitrate was dismal and that the CEDR program
was "ineffective" and "failed." Id. Admittedly, I was an attorney practicing in the
Chicago area representing employers during this very time period, and I was also on
the Board of Advisors of CEDR. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to
direct any more focus on the points raised by Professor Sherwyn, there are some
issues that may have affected the results of his study that require further review, in-
cluding the significant impact of mediation as an alternative after the disputes arose,
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dotally.84 But, if arbitration represents the panacea that some em-
ployers must believe it to be in resolving disputes, then why can they
not agree to it after the dispute arises just as easily as they can agree
to force employees to do it as a condition of employment before the
dispute arises?85
This issue is framed in terms of two competing fears of excess: cor-
porate damage via excessive verdicts with outrageous punitive dam-
ages assessed by a runaway jury versus employee ruin created by
corporate greed resulting from opportunistic behavior and excessive
abuse of power. Nevertheless, employees lose employment discrimi-
nation claims on average ninety percent of the time, and employers
are so fascinated with the prospect of preventing those ten percent
from getting to a jury that they are devising mandatory arbitration
agreements. 86 Similar to unfounded concerns about runaway jury ver-
dicts, hopefully, the Enron fiasco and other recent acts of corporate
greed will represent uniquely tragic situations and will not indicate the
norm or warrant overall corporate distrust.
87
the lack of involved attorney representatives for the claimant employees, and the
number of corporate outside counsel that were involved in the decision rather than in-
house counsel or corporate executives who are both much more litigation-averse.
84. Other skeptics have also asserted that few employers will choose to use arbi-
tration after the dispute has arisen. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rick-
shaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 563, 567-68 (2001); St. Antoine, Mandatory,
supra note 13, at 8 & n.25; Weiler, supra note 53, at 196.
85. Nevertheless, if commentators like Professors Estreicher, Sherwyn, St. An-
toine, and Weiler are correct that no employer will want to agree to arbitrate after a
dispute arises, then the law should step in and provide some incentives for parties to
enter into an agreement to arbitrate after a dispute arises if arbitration is such a good
system rather than just accepting employer or lawyer preference as the end of the
matter. See Green, Debunking, supra note 4, at 467-70 (proposing an incentive for
post-dispute arbitration through a punitive damage cut-off for agreeing to go to arbi-
tration after a dispute has arisen); Sternlight, Out on a Limb, supra note 4, at 862-63
(suggesting that if employers believe that arbitration is good enough to force employ-
ees into it through mandatory arbitration, it should be good enough to create incen-
tives to force employers into arbitration after a dispute arises). But see Estreicher,
supra note 84, at 567 & n.21 (citing to an empirical study finding that under Mon-
tana's wrongful discharge law "few postdispute offers to arbitrate are accepted by the
other side to the dispute, even where the statute [MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-915
(2003)] imposes attorney's fees on parties rejecting such offers who do not prevail in
litigation.").
86. Rogers, supra note 16, at 640 (suggesting that because of the uncertainty of
litigation, employers may still choose to arbitrate even though there may be better
results for them in court because arbitration is more predictable in terms of "knowing
in advance how much a case might cost and how long it might last").
87. See Hamilton, supra note 80, at 1-40 (providing a thorough, point-by-point
analysis and a chronology of all the major corporate scandals in 2002 including Enron,
WorldCom, and Imclone, among others). In terms of whether this is the norm, only
time will tell, but "[o]n July 8, 2002, the Business Roundtable, a conservative but
influential group of CEOs representing many of the largest companies in the United
States, issued a statement that they have been 'appalled, angered and, finally, alarmed
at the stream of revelations which have emerged in the past six months concerning a
number of public companies'" and that "'the list of affected companies is small in
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The key difference between the issue of corporate greed and exces-
sive verdicts as it applies to employers and employees remains bar-
gaining power. If some employees decide to make excessive claims,
the court system will catch most of them and filter them out. But who
catches the employer whose top managers use their overwhelming
bargaining power and position to make employees miserable and who
possibly even use that power to financially or personally devastate
those employees?"8 Again, usually the court system provides that
mechanism through the ability to sue the employer for overreaching.
It brings to bear tort and statutory-based claims for harm to employ-
ees beyond typical contractual remedies. This system also allows em-
ployees to have a jury decide those issues.
At some point, employers have to recognize that corporate greed
has consequences. When employees are not able to play a significant
role in their governance, it means problems for the corporation.8 9 In
these times of highlighted corporate greed and highlighted excessive
verdicts, it is uncertain as to whether either of these issues really rep-
resents a major problem. But, due to bargaining power, the balance
should start to fall more toward employee protection from corporate
greed and excess than employer protection from excessive jury ver-
dicts. The corporate abuse at Enron and other highly publicized cor-
porate governance issues over the last two years may be rare
occurrences that do not warrant a rush to make some judicial or legis-
lative fix. However, the corporate greed and excess involved with im-
plementing mandatory arbitration agreements is a reality.
Accordingly, the specter of having employees band together to negoti-
ate agreements for arbitration presents a worthy curb to that greedy
and excessive use of bargaining power to force the agreements in the
first instance.
comparison to the more than 11,000 publicly traded U.S. companies."' Id. at 37-38
(quoting Press Release, The Business Roundtable, The Business Roundtable State-
ment on Restoring Investor Trust (July 8, 2002), at http://www.brt.org/press.cfm/728
(last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review)).
88. See Matthew W. Finkin and Sanford M. Jacoby, Introduction to Employees and
Corporate Governance, 22 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 1-2 (2000) (suggesting that a
collective employee voice in corporate governance can occur with or without a union,
and it can play a role in holding top management accountable to those who have a big
stake in the enterprise).
89. See Nadel, supra note 70, at 2756 (describing the problems with employee mo-
rale due to mandatory arbitration); see also Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stall-
worth, Who Files Suits and Why?: An Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981
U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 118-19 (describing how the lack of employee voice in the work-
place is a major contributor to why employees file lawsuits against their employers).
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IV. USING UNIONS TO PROVIDE EMPLOYEES A BALANCE IN
BARGAINING POWER AND TO CREATE A DETERRENT FOR
EMPLOYERS' EXCESSIVE ATTEMPTS TO USE
MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Many forms of collective employee action may force employers to
second-guess their attempts to use mandatory arbitration agreements,
including the use of private class actions, EEOC group-based claims,
or a more grassroots, politically-based effort. The most effective
means of using collective activity to balance bargaining power in ne-
gotiating agreements to arbitrate would be applied through union or-
ganizing and union representation. 9° Most of the gains, both political
and personal, from other grassroots and collective employee activities
can also be obtained by union organizing and involvement. But with
union involvement, employees and employers can enjoy the added
benefit from ongoing relations that do not play a role in other collec-
tive employee activities. 91 Accordingly, labor unions present the best
option to help individual employees in collectively and fairly bargain-
ing with their employer, and unions offer the best deterrent to em-
ployer attempts to continue mandatory arbitration. 92 If a union was
able to become the agent for bargaining on behalf of the interests of a
group of employees,93 then that union would have significant bargain-
90. Of course, employees can join together and take direct political action, includ-
ing boycotting select companies that are proponents of mandatory arbitration or
forming more direct coalitions with civil rights groups. Professor Leroy Clark has
suggested that unions and civil rights organizations should form coalitions because
both entities have led major movements for justice that are now stagnant to the point
of being in a crisis. See Leroy D. Clark, Movements in Crisis: Employee-Owned Busi-
ness-A Strategy for Coalition Between Unions and Civil Rights Organizations, 46
How. L.J. 49 (2002). Specifically, Professor Clark proposes a coalition for the two
groups around employee-owned businesses. Id. at 51-52.
91. See Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 122-23 (2000) (noting political gains de-
rived from labor activism on behalf of employees including favorable media coverage,
symbolic values to employees that the company is not out to hurt employees, ac-
knowledgment that workers are competent to help management in making strategic
business decisions, and that various coalitions can develop including those with labor
and shareholders in the company).
92. Mitu Gulati, Incorporating Labor, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 171, 174
(2000) (noting how labor unions provide a significant deterrent effect to corporate
opportunistic behavior); O'Connor, supra note 91, at 98-100, 119-20 (arguing the im-
portance of including workers' voice in corporate decision making, especially with the
growing dependence on human capital in a global market, and noting how unions can
provide a curb to corporate excess including excessive executive compensation which
drags down the company's success); see also Scalia, supra note 45, at 499 (noting that
unions should be in a better position to represent individual employees in discrimina-
tion disputes than plaintiffs' lawyers).
93. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the Labor
Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration and Workplace Commit-
tees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 75 (2002) (noting that unions may be able to work
for the interests of nonunion employees up to a certain point). A union could bargain
on behalf of the employees solely for the purpose of establishing an arbitration agree-
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ing power, especially if those employees had chosen the union to be
their representative consistent with the protections and requirements
of the NLRA.94 Also, just the threat of union organization could de-
ter employers from seeking mandatory arbitration agreements.
Other forms of collective employee response, including class ac-
tions, political boycotts, and EEOC lawsuits, do not create the type of
deterrence to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements that union
organization would create. Furthermore, most of those other collec-
tive actions have so far unsuccessfully sought a long-term resolution to
the bargaining power issue through either judicial interpretation or
legislative change. Now, employees should take things into their own
hands by seeking the assistance of unions.
A. Union Organizing: Actual Representation of Employees as a
Deterrent and Response to Excessive Use of
Employer Bargaining Power
A number of commentators have asserted that mandatory arbitra-
tion may be better for employees because of the inability to obtain
counsel and the difficulty of prevailing in the court system without
counsel.95 However, nonunion employees in employment arbitration
would still have problems with obtaining counsel and paying the costs
of arbitration. At a minimum, organizing nonunion employees into
unions would level the playing field. Of course, it is easier said than
done when it comes to organizing workplaces. 96
Some may argue that union organizing will not do much to help
employees in navigating the bargaining power concerns with
mandatory arbitration because the labor movement is essentially a
ment, or it could become a complete organizing opportunity where the union is the
designated bargaining representative of the employees for all matters. See id. at
81-89. One major concern is that unions not representing a majority of employees
may be subject to claims that they are violating labor law that prohibits employers
from recognizing unions that do not, in fact, represent a majority of employees. Id.;
see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1573 n.204, 1594-95 & n.291 (2002).
94. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2003).
95. See Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gil-
mer's Impact and Legacy, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1051, 1069 (1996) (distinguishing be-
tween the need for legal representation in court versus arbitration, especially given
the difficulty of finding an attorney); Estreicher, supra note 84, at 563 (describing
difficulties for most plaintiffs in obtaining counsel in the court system); St. Antoine,
Gilmer, supra note 13, at 499 (noting that only about five percent of plaintiffs seeking
counsel with an employment claim in court are able to obtain counsel).
96. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organiza-
tion Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776-81 (1983) (describing the diffi-
culties of workers in union organizing campaigns, how they are likely to be fired, and
the travails of whistleblowers); see also Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the
Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 213-14 (1991) (describing same).
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thing of the past.97 There are those who debate whether the union
movement is dead and gone or just on life support. 98 Recent indica-
tors may suggest some growth by unions due to an increase in organiz-
ing.99 Regardless of its current growth, union organizing is still a
major concern for employers who, in general, want to keep their
workplaces nonunion and will go to great efforts to keep it that
way.'
00
While it may not be new to suggest that unions and collective agents
can play a major role in private dispute resolution for individual em-
ployees, 10 ' the use of union organizing as an effective response to con-
97. See Bales, supra note 44, at 693-702 (noting the disappearance of unions in the
private sector workplace, the increase in individual employee rights from 1935 to
1994, and predictions of the continuing decline of unions in the private sector through
2000); Barbara J. Fick, The Changing Face of the American Workplace, 12 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1 (1998) (stating that the American workplace
over the past few decades has evolved into an increasingly part-time or contingent
worker base with the "lowest unionization rates for industrialized countries"); David
C. Yamada, Voices From the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee
Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (1998)
("[Slince only ten percent of the non-agricultural private sector workforce belongs to
unions, these avenues for worker expression are much fewer and farther between.").
98. See Befort, supra note 72, at 361-62 (chronicling the clear decline in American
unions over the last 50 years with 31.5% of the non-agricultural labor force being
unionized in 1950, 34.7% in 1954, down to 24.7% by 1970, 16.1% by 1990, and 13.5%
in 2000 and even more drastic drops in total union membership over this time in the
private sector which is essentially a drop from over 30% in 1950 to only 9% in 2000);
William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Every-
thing Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 262 (2002) (noting that
unions are no longer "a major player in most workplaces.., and represent only about
thirteen and a half percent of the workforce and about nine percent of the private
sector workforce" in 2000); see also Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological
Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law,
48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 651-54 (2001) [hereinafter Stone, Changing Workplace] (rec-
ognizing diminished labor and making broad proposals that would change the land-
scape if a citizen union formed to take up employee issues); Weiler, supra note 53, at
185-86 (noting a decline in unionism from about 40% of the private sector in 1947
and down to less than 10% in the late 1990s and noting a corresponding reduction of
at least 20% in wages). •
99. See Maria Ontiveros, Work in the 21st Century-Creating the Social Architec-
ture, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 511, 515 (2003) (noting the agreement of a management attor-
ney, a union attorney, and a president of a local union that "the labor movement is on
the rise" as all three have "witnessed a recent increase in union organizing and grass-
roots activism"). But see Befort, supra note 72, at 361-63 (noting a general decline in
the union movement from 1950 to 2000).
100. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies,
and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 375, 375, 380 (2003) (noting that avoidance of union organizing is a big reason
why employers adopt dispute resolution procedures in the nonunion setting and any
"threat of unionization can strongly influence the organizational practices of nonun-
ion employers" as proven by historical and contemporary studies).
101. Corrada, supra note 95, at 1055 (asserting that the Gilmer decision represents
a shift to resolving employment disputes in a private rather than a public arena and
imploring the left to take advantage of this shift rather than fight it); see also Rabin,
supra note 96, at 204-18 (asserting that a key role for unions can be to help nonunion
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cerns about mandatory arbitration does not appear to be on the radar
screen for organized labor.' 0 2 The failure of organized labor to take
advantage of this opportunity to organize is interesting given the cur-
rent desires of a large number of nonunion employees.
In their recent study, Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that
nonunion employees want more involvement in how decisions are
made in the workplace and at least one-third would like to have union
representation. 10 3 Accordingly, it is surprising that unions have not
taken on the issue of mandatory arbitration as a source for organizing
when its coercion of employees arguably reflects an attempt to pre-
vent worker empowerment, a reason why many nonunion employees
are interested in either unions or some form of collective committee
to address workplace issues. 10 4 This would appear to be a major area
and a unique opportunity for organizing. What better time is there
workers address public rights and negotiate with employers about those rights). Pro-
fessor Corrada also believes that concerns about bargaining power can be ameliorated
through institutional entities, like the ABA, and private ADR providers, that can
limit employer efforts to make agreements too one-sided. Corrada, supra note 95, at
1053, 1067-68.
102. See Yamada, supra note 97, at 14 & n.72 (discussing the overall decline in
union membership and providing a skeptical look at organized labor's new efforts to
focus on campaigns to increase membership); see also Crain & Matheny, Identity,
supra note 35, at 1809 (noting that various groups wrote amicus briefs in the Circuit
City case when it was before the Supreme Court, but organized labor did not partici-
pate). Professor Bales argued quite forcefully that there were many benefits to or-
ganized labor in getting involved with the arbitration of individual employee disputes
back in 1997 and believed it could be "a potent selling point" in increasing the oppor-
tunities for organizing more employees, including women and minorities. Bales,
supra note 44, at 753. While I assume that organized labor may not necessarily be
focused on the great ideas of academics, it also just may be unwilling to bridge the gap
through a focus on individual employee rights because most of those rights have ac-
crued to protect against discrimination in the workplace, rather than focusing on over-
all better wages for workers, a theme that appears to be the focus of modern labor.
See Crain and Matheny, Identity, supra note 35, at 1787.
103. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 150-55
(1999) (describing statistical results from a study of workers and their desires). Ac-
cording to their study, those workers may not necessarily be interested in having a
union represent their interests and would rather deal directly with employers on a
number of items, possibly through an employee committee. Id. at 135-36. Neverthe-
less, the use of a mandatory arbitration agreement, especially on a broad scale, may
send a message to those employees that if they want their voices to be heard, it will
only be through expanding their bargaining power. By joining together and using a
union to bargain for them about their participation, they do not have to depend upon
the employer to allow the use of work committees. Excellent analyses of the Freeman
and Rogers study can be found in Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the "Representation
Gap", 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391 (2001) and Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee
Participation/Representation Gap: An Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 491 (2001).
104. Although the problem may be that unions have not only historically separated
themselves from issues of social justice in the workplace regarding race and gender
discrimination, they continue to identify themselves in an orientation that is too fo-
cused on general financial justice. See Crain and Matheny, Identity, supra note 35, at
1781-87.
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than now for unions to be creative in their organizing efforts? Be-
cause unions currently face growing concerns about their decreasing
membership, "only fresh approaches" to organizing "will generate
new membership [for unions] in the private sector.',
10 5
Some employers are already realizing that they are lowering morale
by using mandatory arbitration agreements. 10 6 That reduced morale
may make those employers more susceptible to a union organizing
campaign. 10 7 In fact, at least one human resources expert and senior
counsel for employers believes that "mandatory arbitration ... will
end up costing employers in terms of turnover, morale, and worker
performance" and that it is "not the way to get productivity out of
people.
o10 8
With the AFL-CIO union leadership focusing on how to increase its
membership, mandatory arbitration could become a rallying cry for
organizers. Apparently, there are "now roughly fifteen million non-
union employees-nearly one-third of the total in all but the tiny
firms in the private sector-who would now like to have union repre-
sentation (and more than 90% of employees who now have union rep-
resentation [that] want to keep it)." 109 The unions could target some
key companies who have obviously bought into the value of
mandatory arbitration agreements, as evidenced by the number of
court cases where they have argued to enforce the agreements. One
such company might include Circuit City." 0 A union could target this
105. Clark, supra note 90, at 60; see also Estlund, supra note 93, at 1532, 1605 n.326
(citing an AFL-CIO manual describing new tactics for labor organizing campaigns
including "coalitions with other groups; legislative initiatives; appeals to regulatory
agencies; litigation; consumer actions; pressuring creditors and lenders; withdrawals
of, or threats to withdraw, pension fund assets; shareholder actions; and in-plant ac-
tions"); Peggy R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household
Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 50 n.16
(2000) (discussing new organizing strategies for "low-wage service" workers).
106. See Nadel, supra note 70, at 2756 (describing comments from Stuart Brody, a
senior counsel and member of a Human Resources think tank called the Employment
Roundtable, that a mandatory arbitration agreement causes low morale because it
"'send[s] out the message' . . . that the employer 'is in charge'" and that such
messages are "counterproductive" to establishing a "high-performance workplace and
increasing retention rates").
107. See MARTIN JAY LEAVITT & TERRY CONROW, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION
BUSTER 49-50 (1993) (listing an opinion of a corporate anti-union campaign leader of
the "five key corporate failings that drive workers to seek union help: lack of recogni-
tion; weak management; poor communication; substandard working conditions; and
non-competitive wages and benefits" and noting that union buster jobs are to train
management to be better managers so that when their "work is done, the company
remains union free because no union is needed" and when "[m]anagement does its
job right, [then] the workers are happy").
108. Nadel, supra note 70, at 2756 (quoting Stuart Brody, Senior Counsel at Gib-
ney, Anthony & Flaherty, LLP, New York).
109. Weiler, supra note 53, at 187 (emphasis omitted).
110. There are numerous cases in many jurisdictions involving Circuit City, includ-
ing landmark Supreme Court Cases, where they have sought to enforce mandatory
arbitration agreements. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001);
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company's employees with a message explaining to them the lack of
consent involved in mandatory arbitration agreements, and what con-
sequences may occur once employees actually have disputes and want
to take their claims to court. The union could offer to represent the
employees to negotiate better agreements regarding working condi-
tions, including a fair hearing in front of an arbitrator with the union
representing the interests of the employees at the arbitration. Also,
the union would be informing the employees of its negotiating exper-
tise and how it could negotiate directly with the employers for a com-
plete grievance and arbitration process.
Even if the continued existence of the labor movement is hanging
by a thread, it would seem that efforts to resurrect it or bring about a
resurgence would benefit from a new and potentially powerful or-
ganizing tool. That tool would be the opportunity to appeal to work-
ers employed by companies that still continue to push mandatory
arbitration agreements with the message that the only fair way for
them ever to have their voices heard and interests pursued in the
workplace is to have a union represent those interests. The following
is an example of a possible message, but actually an imaginary mes-
sage, with Circuit City used as a potential example target of organiz-
ing due to its widespread use of mandatory arbitration agreements:"'1
Dear Fellow Workers of Circuit City,
Your employer does not want your input in the workplace about
things of concern to you. Instead, your employer wants you to just
shut up and accept it. That is why it requires that you agree as a
condition of employment to waive your hard-fought right to a jury
trial if it ends up committing egregious acts of discrimination against
you. It doesn't want a jury consisting of your peers, even possibly
fellow employees, to judge the merits of any dispute you may have
with it. Your employer does this despite knowing that you are a
nonunion, at-will employee, which means it already has the right to
terminate you for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Yet,
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2003); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677,
680 (8th Cir. 2001); Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 634, 635 (7th Cir.
1999); Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 1998); Wright v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (N.D. Ala. 2000). For that reason,
I have listed it as a company that may potentially be the focus of a union organizer.
Professor Ann Hodges has also identified "Circuit City" as a "well-known" employer
using mandatory arbitration agreements along with several other employers including
"Waffle House, Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Tenet Health Care, Hooter's, and
O'Charley's." Hodges, Section 7, supra note 50, at 178-79 & n.19.
111. As noted earlier, Circuit City is one of the primary employers which use
mandatory arbitration agreements and it has fought in many jurisdictions to protect
and enforce its mandatory arbitration program. See supra note 110. That makes this
company ripe for an example of how union organizing could play a role via the type
of campaign propaganda involved in this imaginary message I have drafted.
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your employer wants to pile it on you by forcing you to agree to
arbitrate.
Is there anything you can do about this? There are possibly a few
things you can do on your own. But, if you let us be your represen-
tative, we can take care of this issue by using the collective bargain-
ing power of all employees to level the playing field and obtain a
fair and honest arbitration agreement. And we would represent you
in that arbitration process should it ever be necessary. Just imagine
trying to find and being able to afford a lawyer to navigate the court
system. If you don't believe what we say, we can show you the doz-
ens of publicly reported legal decisions where your employer has
fought long and hard to prevent individual employees from having
their day in court. Your employer can't deny its actions. So your
employer doesn't want your input and doesn't care about you hav-
ing more of a say in what goes on at the workplace. Your employer
advertises to its customers that "we're with you," and not to worry
about exchanges, just bring it back "hassle-free."' 1 2 Unfortunately,
the employer is not saying that to you, its employees, by forcing you
to give up the right to a jury without making it a fair and honest
exchange for you. This is an employer that is not with you, hassle-
free. That has been made clear. But we'll be with you if you let us
represent your interests and bring our collective bargaining power
together on your behalf. We are for fairness in the workplace and
we'll be with you even if you do have a complaint about how you
are treated.
Signed, Imaginary Union to Employees of Circuit City.
1 13
B. Union Involvement: Creative Representation of the Employment
Interests of Nonunion Employees in Arbitration as an
Equalizer and a Deterrent
Unions could also represent employees in bargaining and arbitra-
tion without actually seeking to organize them. If the union ever does
attempt to organize the employees, this raises some interesting ques-
tions as to whether the union will be considered to have taken the
improper action of coercing employees by conferring benefits upon
those who will be asked to vote for the union."' While there are
112. The service mark for Circuit City is "We're with you" and they offer a "Has-
sle-Free Return policy." See http://www.circuitcity.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) (on
file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
113. Although this is imaginary, unions can have wide discretion in developing
campaign propaganda. See, e.g. Contex Div., SPX Corp. v. NLRB, 164 F.3d 297, 309
(6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting employer's arguments that statements made by the union on
campaign paraphernalia were inappropriate, misleading, and affected the voting for
the union, and allowing a broad protection for union campaign statements).
114. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57 (2002) (describing how a necessary role for unions
and their lawyers is to help nonunion employees enforce rights established through
common law and statutes but a major concern is that unions which have provided
services or support to a group of employees may be charged with vote-buying as a
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some concerns, Professor Catherine Fisk has made some persuasive
arguments that unions and their lawyers should be able to assist non-
union employees without any repercussions, and she suggested some
ways to get around any organizing issues related to an election by ei-
ther not seeking an election and just demanding recognition or not
seeking to actually represent the employees. 115 In any respect, with
the changing workforce and a declining percentage of union workers,
many commentators have called for a new form of unionism that does
not follow the traditional model under the NLRA.116 This new model
or aspect of labor law reform would allow unions to represent nonun-
ion employees' interests, either at the bargaining table, in an arbitra-
tion, or in various roles where the NLRA would not act as a
hindrance.'
17
form of an unfair labor practice under labor law which could set aside an organizing
campaign election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board).
115. Id. at 78-79 (noting the incentives that unions will have to organize outside of
union elections if giving pre-election legal help to employees will set aside an
election).
116. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Making Labor's Rhetoric Reality, 5 GREE-
NBAG 2D. 17, 22-25 (2001) [hereinafter Crain & Matheny, Rhetoric] (describing re-
forms to include making collective bargaining a civil right; abolishing majority rule/
exclusive representation; expanding the definition of labor organization in the NLRA
to include advocates for racial, gender, ethnic or other social justice; making gender &
racial justice, including anti-discrimination measures, mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing; overruling Gardner-Denver and substituting arbitration under collective bargain-
ing agreements for court enforcement of anti-discrimination rights; eliminating the
ban on secondary boycotts; and providing for interest arbitration as a mechanism for
settling labor disputes); see also Befort, supra note 72, at 421-60 (describing the need
for creative changes in labor law and providing four proposals including: creating a
just cause standard for employment security law; leveling the bargaining playing field
between unions and employers; creating an employee work council for effective voice;
and enhancing protection for the contingent workforce); Clark, supra note 90, at
51-52 (proposing employee-owned coalitions between unions and civil rights groups);
Corbett, supra note 98, at 299-306 (discussing new ways to build relationships be-
tween unions and nonunion employees); Fisk, supra note 114, at 75-79 (looking at a
role for unions in helping nonunion workers in arbitration); Hodges, Section 7 Rights,
supra note 50, at 215 (promoting class actions to remedy bargaining power concerns);
Ontiveros, supra note 99, at 515 (discussing a symposium presentation promoting de-
velopment of community unionism or citizenship unions); Scalia, supra note 45, at
496-99 & n. 32 (arguing that instead of focusing on reviving the labor movement to its
heyday of collective action, the focus of reform should be on integrating a role for
unions as advocates related to existing employment laws, especially in handling arbi-
tration of employment discrimination disputes now being implemented through
mandatory arbitration); Stone, Changing Workplace, supra note 98, at 632-53
(describing developments of two new forms of unionism: craft unionism and citizen
unionism); Weiler, supra note 53, at 197 (talking about freeing up nonunion employ-
ees to have more involvement via committees or employee involvement plans and to
have fair, employer-created plans to arbitrate disputes without running afoul of the
NLRA).
117. See, e.g., Hodges, Section 7 Rights, supra note 50, at 217, 228-29 (arguing that
attempts of individual nonunion employees to seek court actions would invoke Sec-
tion 7 rights under the NLRA and be protected concerted activity preventing an em-
ployer from seeking a mandatory arbitration agreement). See also Crain & Matheny,
Identity, supra note 35, at 1843-46 (proposing reforms that would allow unions to
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Although there are a number of legal concerns about unions being
able to represent the interests of nonunion workers,' 18 there are many
creative approaches available in how to do this.1" 9 Furthermore, the
threat of representation can have a powerful effect on how a company
decides to operate. Out of fears about unions taking on issues that are
generally within management discretion and responsibility, a lot of
employers use methods to prevent unions from organizing their em-
ployees. 120 Employers likely fear the threat of a union more than the
threat of an employee obtaining a large jury verdict.12 ' Accordingly,
branch out to women and minorities that are not represented by the union and pro-
vide services and representation in arbitration or to provide incentives where they will
join the union and get the benefits of union representation in negotiations and arbi-
tration); Stone, Changing Workplace, supra note 98, at 651-53 (proposing reforms to
labor law to meet pressing needs of today's workforce).
118. See Fisk, supra note 114, at 60-104 (describing, in general, a role for unions
and their lawyers, but noting the barriers imposed by the NLRA in that a union's
efforts to help nonunion employees may be a problem if the union later seeks to
represent those employees because the issue of vote-buying can be raised in an at-
tempt to set aside the union election results, along with various ethical issues). Also,
Professor Finkin has raised some legal issues under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. 158(a)(2), which prevents organizations that are either employer dominated or
that do not represent a majority of the employees from acting as the union represen-
tative for those employees. Finkin, supra note 93, at 97-100. Additionally, Professor
Finkin has raised an interesting issue about unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 88
n.55; see also Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 5-10 (Cal. 1998) (finding that New York attorneys, not licensed in California,
who had counseled parties in arbitration held in California had been involved in the
unauthorized practice of law under California law and could not collect their attor-
ney's fees for this unlicensed work). Another barrier involves secondary boycotts if
the union attempts to effectuate change from employers that do not have employees
represented by that union. See Crain & Matheny, Identity, supra note 35, at 1789-90
(discussing problems with the scope of secondary boycotts); Crain & Matheny, Rheto-
ric, supra note 116, at 24-25 (proposing to eliminate the ban on secondary boycotts);
Stone, Changing Workplace, supra note 98, at 626-28 (describing how secondary boy-
cotts put boundaries on what unions can do and limit what pressures they may seek to
help with their agenda as the workplace expands).
119. See Finkin, supra note 93, at 80-95 (suggesting that when employers create an
arbitration system that sweeps in public law, they are expecting unions to become a
part of that system and promoting the use of unions to arbitrate nonunion employee
disputes by providing legal services and acting as employee safety committee repre-
sentatives); Crain & Matheny, Identity, supra note 35, at 1822-24, 1841-46 (asserting a
moral imperative and proposing that unions take on the role of focusing on social
justice by proposing various reforms to assist with that focus); Stone, Changing Work-
place, supra note 98, at 640-52 (suggesting creative ways to have unions expand into
protecting the interests of nonunion workers, including the use of a citizen union for-
mat). Professor Hodges has also argued that legal maneuvering could be used in
favor of allowing unions to take on these tasks by arguing that efforts of nonunion
employees to seek court relief regarding their terms and conditions of employment
involve an exercise of rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA and any attempts to
prevent employees from exercising those rights would violate the NLRA. See
Hodges, Section 7 Rights, supra note 50, at 228-30.
120. See LEAVITr & CONROW, supra note 107; Colvin, supra note 100, at 380.
121. Compare Estlund, supra note 93, at 1596 ("Not only do most employers
strongly prefer to operate non-union, but they have the economic power to impose
that preference on their employees if the law does not effectively intervene" because
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just the possibility of having more union involvement with nonunion
employees should make employers rethink the value of mandatory ar-
bitration if that becomes the impetus for inciting more union involve-
ment in their workplaces.
A long history of separation exists between unions and civil rights
groups, which causes a major degree of skepticism as to whether or-
ganized labor is up to or willing to take on the task of making racial,
gender, and other forms of social justice in the workplace a major fo-
cus of its organizing efforts despite its vast potential for union growth
and its appeal to nonunion employees.122 Hopefully, organized labor
will see the benefits of having this agenda and the kind of powerful
coalitions with civil rights groups that can develop.
If coalitions with civil rights groups do not occur, unions and em-
ployees may still receive positive effects from organizing attempts fo-
cused on negotiating and processing disputes through arbitration."2 3
The unions may still be able to expand and organize more workplaces
just by getting their foot in the door on an issue that could resonate
with those nonunion employees who are already seeking more in-
volvement in workplace decisions. Also, as a possible response or just
as a further mechanism of control, employers may try to cut the head
off of this movement by deciding that mandatory arbitration is just not
worth it and rid itself of those agreements.124 Thus, union organizing
provides a powerful deterrent to the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements, and this deterrent effect represents the most probable re-
employers "own the workplace, and they effectively own the employees' jobs under
the prevailing American presumption of employment at will."), and Colvin, supra
note 100, at 380 (noting employers actions and concerns in response to the union
threat) with Green, Debunking, supra note 4, at 448 & n.175 (finding over ninety
percent of cases are resolved in the employer's favor before trial).
122. In-depth discussion of the historic problems and conflicts between unions and
civil rights groups is beyond the scope of this Article, but others have addressed it.
See, e.g., Crain & Matheny, Identity, supra note 35, at 1785-88 (raising the historical
problems and conflicts with unions and civil rights groups as a concern, and question-
ing the resolve of organized labor to have a social justice focus rather than a class
focus given a recent effort by organized labor to "put aside race and gender
interests").
123. Under this scenario, the unions would merely be using the mandatory arbitra-
tion issue as a tool to organize more employees without focusing on a social justice
message. See id. (criticizing organized labor for taking this focus, but recognizing that
this is the approach of their current leadership). Organized labor has started to focus
on organizing and it has had some slight success since John Sweeney became the head
of the AFL-CIO in 1995. Id. at 1784-85 (noting how a renewed commitment to or-
ganizing has paid off to some extent).
124. Although the Gilmer decision, which got most of this started, involved parties
in the securities industry, the securities industry has all but abolished the use of
mandatory arbitration based upon collective responses through class action settle-
ments, and political backlash from pressures by civil rights groups, politicians and
plaintiffs' lawyers. See Green, Debunking, supra note 4, at 427-28 & nn.106-07.
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suit given that employers will not likely welcome the presence of un-
ions in their nonunion workplace.' 25
V. CONCLUSION
Individual employees and applicants for employment should re-
spond to employer efforts to require arbitration as a condition of em-
ployment by leveling the playing field and using their collective
bargaining power to negotiate satisfactory agreements to arbitrate
with employers or to deter employers from continuing to pursue
mandatory arbitration agreements. This Article asserts that the use of
unions will best help achieve the balance of power between employees
and employers in negotiating arbitration agreements. If those collec-
tive efforts are implored, they can impress upon employers the need
for sensitivity to individual employees' bargaining concerns with re-
spect to arbitration. These collective efforts can provide a counterbal-
ance to employers in a rush to unilaterally contract their workforce
into arbitration agreements. In these times of concern about corpo-
rate greed and runaway juries, cooler heads need to prevail. The cur-
rent opportunistic use of bargaining power by employers
implementing mandatory arbitration agreements must be balanced by
the use of unions to help individual employees negotiate and navigate
arbitration procedures. Then, concerns about bargaining power will
no longer play a major role in how statutory employment disputes get
into arbitration. Hopefully, other pending critical issues, including ra-
cial, gender, and class concerns about arbitration, may become the
focus.
125. See LEAVITT & CONROW, supra note 107, at 53 (noting how most executives
that union buster consultants work with are "in a state of panic about the union
drive," and that they are willing to do anything due to "their hatred and fear of the
union"). Professor Finkin has creatively suggested many ways in which unions can
play a role in representing nonunion employees in arbitration. See Finkin, supra note
93, at 76-86 (asserting a role for unions in nonunion employee arbitration). But, most
of those roles assume that employers will accept the role of unions in arbitration of
nonunion employees, even begrudgingly. Id. at 80 (contending that employers have
invited unions to become involved by sweeping in public law into their agreements to
arbitrate and employers cannot deny unions from getting involved). However, a quite
reasonable response from employers will be to fight any involvement of unions in a
nonunion workplace, essentially because of the threat of organization. LEAVITT &
CONROW, supra note 107, at 53.
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